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Abstract
The contrasting economic records of Latin American and East Asian countries for the last few decades
have motivated vast researches. Many economic policies and development strategies were tested as
relevant variables for their successes and failures. This paper intends to explore a less studied aspect,
education and culture for the same purpose. One important issue regarding Korean experience in
education is how education has played such a significant role in the economic development process with
only meager investment. The emphasis given to the primary and secondary education compared to the
tertiary was found to be the key both to increase the efficiency of educational investment and to form a
virtuous cycle between education and income distribution. And the expansionist strategy even sacrificing
material conditions of education was an additional source of increasing returns to educational
investment. Another issue is whether the success of East Asian countries can be replicated by other
developing nations. If culture matters, the answer will be negative. But the concept of culture is so broad
that it cannot be a explanatory variable determining long-run economic growth of a nation. Since many
variables, classified as cultural, can be changed by policies,  there is no reason why other poor countries
should not aspire to the remarkable progress witnessed in East Asia.
I. Introduction
The contrasting economic records of Latin American and East Asian countries during the last three
decades have motivated vast researches. Many economic policies and development strategies were
tested as relevant variables for their successes and failures. The inward-looking import substitution
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2policies of Latin American countries vs. the outward-oriented trade policies of East Asian countries is
just one example. This paper intends to explore a less studied aspect, education and culture.
The central question addressed in this paper is how the education in Korea could play such a significant
role in the economic development process with only meager investment. And the second question is
whether the success of East Asian countries can be replicated by other developing nations. If culture
matters, the answer will be negative.
We begin our inquiry in section 2, by introducing four different interpretations -- Neoclassical,
Revisionist, No Miracle, Mere Luck -- of the East Asian performance of the last few decades. In section
3, we survey selectively recent researches which have tested the conventional wisdom of neoclassical
growth model and new growth theories that have provided the ground for alternative interpretation of the
fact. We pay special attention to the role of openness, government intervention and inequality in the
growth process because of the contrasting experiences in Korea and Latin America in relation with these
variables.
We turn to the data on education and draw some inferences in section 4. Four special features of
Korean education, in comparison to the Latin American, are reported: 1) the initial schooling was higher
in Korea; 2) the public investment on education had higher return in Korea; 3) the interaction between
education and income distribution formed a virtuous cycle in Korea; 4) the quantitative expansion has
also contributed to the efficiency. In section 5, we try to show the limitations of the cultural determinism
and section 6 summarize our tentative conclusions.
II. Four Interpretations of the East Asian Performance
East Asian countries have a remarkable record of unusually high and sustained economic growth for the
last few decades. There have been thousands studies emerging to explain this phenomenon. This
literature can be grouped into several  with different views according to their interpretation and
assessment of the performance. Most economists would agree that their performance was unusual
success and there are major lessons to be drawn for other countries, but some others would deny the
success itself  or the chance to learn any lesson. And even among those who agree on, what these
lessons are remains subject to considerable controversy.
“Neoclassical” View:
The East Asian countries’ ustained high growth combined with low and declining income inequality was
really a  miracle requiring explanation. The neoclassical view attributes the remarkable success to rapid
accumulation of physical and human capital, sound macroeconomic management, rapidly declining
population growth, and market-friendly government policies.
3Adherents of the neoclassical view stress in getting the basics right. They argue that the
successful Asian economies have been better than others at providing a stable
macroeconomic environment and a reliable legal framework to promote domestic and
international competition. They also stress that the orientation of the East Asian economies
toward international trade and  the absence of price controls have led to low relative price
distortions. Investment in people, education, and health are legitimate roles for government
in the neoclassical framework, and its adherents stress the importance of human capital.”
(World Bank, 1993)
“Neo-mercantilist or Revisionist” View:
The advocates of this view have successfully shown that East Asia does not wholly conform to the
neoclassical model. Industrial policy  and interventions in financial markets in some countries, notably
Japan, Korea and Taiwan,  are not easily reconciled within the neoclassical framework. These countries
maintained significant trade barriers during their periods of rapid growth. Revisionists contend that
markets consistently fail to guide investment to industries that would generate the highest growth for the
overall economy. In East Asia, governments remedied this failure by deliberately ‘g tting the price
wrong’ - altering the incentive structure - to boost industries that would not otherwise have thrived.
(World Bank, 1993)
The revisionist view appears to be gaining theoretical support from new trade theories that explicitly
incorporate features such as imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, as well as from
theories of endogenous growth. The literature on new trade theories admits a possibility that an export
subsidy to a domestic oligopolist may increase national welfare. To be specific, the presence of
increasing returns to scale, combined with technology spillover, may make it possible for industrial
subsidies to permanently alter comparative advantage and thus raise national income.
“Myth of Asia’s Miracle or No Miracle” View:
Once appropriate allowances have been made for the large increases in labor force participation rates
and for high investment levels, the rates of total factor productivity increase in the four tigers (Korea,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) were not unusually high, especially when compared to those in the
industrial countries during their convergence in the 1960s and 1970s.(Young, 1993, 1994)
Because “economic growth that is based on expansion of inputs, rather than on growth in output per unit
of inputs, is inevitably subject to diminishing returns,” he implication of this “Myth of Asia’s Miracle” view
is that “rapid Asian growth is less of a model for the West than many writers claim, and the future
prospects for that growth are more limited than almost anyone now imagines.”(Krugman, 1994)
4Although there remains question to be answered, such as why only East Asian countries have
succeeded to mobilize their resources while other developing countries have failed, Krugman’s
prediction seems to be vindicated by the Asian currency and financial crisis of 1997. Furthermore, this
view has reminded us the importance of productivity growth and technologies and has shown us the
policy direction to pursue.
“Mere Luck” view:
Growth rates are highly unstable over time so that differences among countries, or groups of countries,
are likely to be ephemeral (Wood, 1997). Shocks, especially those to terms of trade, rather than country
characteristics such as education levels or political stability play a large role in explaining variance in
growth. It means economic growth depends more on ‘go d luck’ than on ‘good policy’. This argument
may be true for average of 115 countries in the sample of  Easterly et al.(1993). But the issue is why the
East Asian countries remain outlier in the sample.
III. Determinants of Economic growth
There has been a rush to test the conventional wisdom of neoclassical growth model. Among them the
most comprehensive studies are Barro and Lee(1993), Barro(1996), Hall and Jones(1996),
Rodrik(1997), and Sachs and Warner(1997).
Barro(1996) reports empirical finding that strongly supports the general notion of neoclassical
convergence. In his words, “for a given starting level of real per capita GDP, the growth rate is enhanced
by higher initial schooling and life expectancy, lower fertility, lower government consumption, better
maintenance of the rule of law, lower inflation, and improvements in terms of trade. For given values of
these and other variables, growth is negatively related to the initial level of real per capita GDP. Political
freedom has only a weak effect on growth but there is some indication of a nonlinear relation.”
Rodrik(1997) obtains a very similar result confirming the contribution of initial income and initial
education level, but extended role of institutional quality that is measured taking into account factors like
quality of the bureaucracy, rule of law, risk of expropriation and repudiation of contract by government.
In Sachs and Warner(1997), once again, the conventional wisdom is confirmed. Other things being
equal, initial conditions -- GDP per capita and schooling -- matter. Demographic variables such as life
expectancy, dependency ratio, population growth ate affect the saving and investment in education, in
turn, growth rate. Openness, government saving, and institutional quality are also proved crucial for
economic development. In addition to these variables, they adds physical geography. Landlocked
countries grew more slowly than coastal economies. And tropical countries grew more slowly than those
5temperate zones. A surprising result is the negative correlation between endowment of natural
resources and growth rates reported in Sachs and Warner(1995).
Openness and Growth
Since the Mercantilist era, social analysts have debated the relation between trade policy and economic
performance. The controversy continues today in spite of numerous studies that claim to find a positive
effect of openness on growth. However, the lack of solid theoretical model and reliable data put in
question the validity of those studies’ conclusions. A wave of new attempts has turned to re-test those
claims with newly accumulated data set. (See Helliwell(1992, 1996); Barro(1996); Frankel, Romer and
Cyrus(1996); Sachs and Warner(1997); Edwards(1997)
The experience of East Asia, supported by these recent researches on growth, has convinced many
observers that an outward-looking development strategy is conducive to growth. There are at least four
channels through which trade is believed to affect growth. First, international trade allows countries to
specialize according to comparative advantage. Second, international trade provides access to larger
markets and allows greater exploitation of increasing returns. Third, trade can contribute to growth by
creating channels to acquire technology and managerial know-how. Finally, trade can affect economic
performance through its impact on the political process. Trade restrictions generally encourage rent-
seeking actions at the expense of productive activities.
Although all of the above mentioned studies attributes to openness a significant role for the East Asian
growth, in the case of Sachs and Warner(1997), Helliwell(1996) and Frankel et al.(1996), openness is
the dominant explanation. Helliwell(1992) reports that growth is faster in those Asian countries that are
more open to imports and capital movements. This may be because, as emphasized by Grossman and
Helpman(1991), technological spillover could come via imports as easily as exports. Indeed, imports of
natural resources, intermediate inputs, and capital goods played a crucial role in Korea’s rapid growth.
Though Korea’s exports grew faster than her imports, the increase of Korea’s imports in absolute terms
exceeded growth of exports during last thirty years. If the country had been forced to rely on domestic
supplies of raw materials and capital goods, its exports would not have been competitive and thus could
not have grown so rapidly. Thus Korea’s growth was as much import-led as export-led.
Government Intervention and Growth
The controversy between ‘ eoclassical’ and ‘revisionist’ is basically concerning the role of government
intervention in the development process. The fact that in most of East Asian countries the government
played active role permitted the alternative interpretations. They intervened systematically and through
multiple channels to foster development, and in some cases the development of specific industry.
In this respect Korea offers a prime example since growth policies in Korea did involve interventionist
and protectionist elements. The Korean case deserves attention because not only there is disagreement
6about the extent or the role played by government policies, but also both sides claim its experience as
evidence for their contentions.
The standard position to which most orthodox economists subscribe is one of ‘neutral’ or ‘market
friendly’ intervention argument.2 They have reckoned that Korean government intervention was a   effort
to maintain a rough neutrality between the incentives provided to the different industries, thus leading a
virtual free trade regime. World Bank(1991) endorsed this view by declaring that in Korea “intervention
was moderate in the sense that it did not lead to large price distortions.”
This orthodox account has been criticized for downplaying the active role of government in shaping the
allocation of resources. 3  Popularizing the revisionist view, Amsden(1989) have argued that the Korean
export-oriented strategy went considerably beyond giving markets and comparative advantage free rein.
According to her, Korean government had clear industrial priorities and did not hesitate to intervene to
get the relative price ‘wrong’ in order to overcome the penalties of late industrialization.
An eclectic interpretation that does not fully support the revisionist view but sympathizes with i ,
emphasizes the pre-conditions for success of intervention policy. In assessing the role of selective
interventions for growth, World Bank(1993) concludes that “in a few economies, mainly in northeast
Asia, government interventions sometimes resulted in higher and more evenly distributed growth than
otherwise would have occurred. The prerequisites for success were so rigorous, however, that policy-
makers seeking to follow similar paths in other developing economies have often met with failure.”
Rodrik(1994) also asserts that “that  government intervention could play such a productive role was
conditioned in turn by a set of advantageous initial conditions, namely a favorable human capital
endowment and relatively equal distribution of income and wealth.” Therefore the challenge is not only
to try understand which specific policies may have contributed to growth, but to understand the
institutional and economic circumstances that made them viable.
Despite all the discussion and interest concerning the issue, empirical investigation is surprisingly rare
and the arguments supporting each view are based merely on macroeconomic data or on isolated case
of a particular industry. To evaluate whether selected intervention were good for growth, it need to
investigate the effect of each government intervention such as tariffs, import restrictions, credit and tax
incentives at sectoral level. Yoo(1990) and Lee(1995) have met this demand. Using panel data on 38
Korean manufacturing industries, Lee tested the relationship between government intervention and
sectoral productivity growth. They have presented a completely different view on the subject. The
Korean economic growth has been in spite of government intervention rather than because of it..
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7Inequality and Growth
It has long been economists’ conventional wisdom that the equitable distribution of income and wealth in
East Asian countries played a favorable role in their economic performances, while the extremely
skewed distribution in Latin American countries were a serious impediment to growth. In recent years
many studies have examined the link between inequality and growth. And the conventional wisdom
finally comes under scrutiny.
Benabou(1996) surveys and reports “the main results from twenty-three recent studies of the links from
inequality to growth or investment.” These formal empirical tests, “run over a variety of data sets and
periods with many different measure of income distribution, deliver a consistent message: initial
inequality is detrimental to long-run growth. The magnitude of this effect is consistent across most
studies: a one standard deviation decrease in inequality raises the annual growth rate of GDP per capita
by .5 to .8 percentage points.”
High inequality affects growth rate mainly through investment level. Under incomplete capital market,
many poor people cannot borrow to finance their children’s education. Perotti(1996) confirms that higher
inequality leads to less education, especially at the secondary level. The inequality influences the level
of  investment via fertility change too. Greater equality brings lower fertility rates.
Another possible channel is social conflict and the security of property rights (Benabou(1996);
Perotti(1996). Greater inequality increases the pressure for redistribution; and thus, the investment
becomes riskier.
IV. Education and Economic Growth in Korea
Economists are unanimous on that education is important for economic growth. And recent researches
confirm that the human capital has played major role in the economic development process of Korea. It
is interesting to see what features of Korean education have contributed to its economic success. With a
glance through the basic data on education and some help of the well-established research results, we
may assert the followings:
The initial schooling was higher in Korea.
The school enrollment data (See Table 1) show that, at the beginning of 1970s, Korea had no
advantage of education, both in primary and secondary level, over major Latin American countries
except Brazil. The gross school enrollment ratio of secondary level in Korea began to increase rapidly
from 1975 widening gap  with those of Latin American countries.  In tertiary level, Korean enrollment
ratio was much lower than that of Argentina until 1980 and a little bit higher than those of Brazil and
8Chile. Due to the steady increase during the 1980s and 1990s, it reached very high level even by high
income country’s standard.
The direct comparison of the data raises doubts whether Korea had any advantage in initial schooling
conditions and, consequently,  the validity of cultural root hypothesis of the high Korean investment in
human capital. Considering income level, however, the Korean education level measured in terms of
school enrollment is much higher than major Latin American countries. In 1980 when Korea reached the
comparable income level to Latin American countries (See Table 6), its secondary level enrollment ratio
exceeded far above those of Latin American countries.
The public investment on education had higher returns in Korea.
Although the allocation share of the public expenditure on education for primary level, around 40% to
50%,  is not much different in all four countries, the shares of secondary and tertiary level show big
differences (See Table 2). In 1980, the only year when comparable data is available, Korea ranked in
the middle in  total public spending on formal education and primary education as proportion of GDP.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Korea had been spending less than Chile on primary education and this
relation reversed only in 1990. The marked difference in public spending pattern can be noticed in
secondary and  tertiary level. Korea had been spending far more on secondary level and far less on
tertiary level than Latin American countries.
The first important implication of this spending pattern is on the efficiency of educational investment.
Measuring the efficiency with the benefit-cost ratio of education where the benefits represent the relative
earning differentials by educational level, the returns to investment on secondary education are much
higher than those on tertiary education. (Psacharopoulos, 1972) Therefore, the country that spend more
on secondary education than on tertiary will get higher return on their educational spending. It is the
case of Korea.
The interaction between education and income distribution formed a virtuous
cycle in Korea.
The second implication of the above-mentioned spending pattern is on the distribution of income. The
education contributes to long-run economic growth directly by enhancing productivity of labor force. Also
it works indirectly influencing levels of fertility and rural-urban migration. Another important channel
through which education affects the performance of an economy is its impact on the distribution of
income. This impact, however, may act to increase or to decrease income inequalities depending on
how educational systems are structured.
The reason for eventual perverse effect of formal education on income distribution is the positive
correlation between a worker’s schooling level and his lifetime earnings. If, for financial or any other
reasons, the poor have disadvantage over the rich in access to secondary and higher educational
9opportunities, the public spending on these levels of education will end up subsidizing the middle and
upper income class students who actually enjoy the educational opportunities of these level and,
consequently, the educational system may help to perpetuate or to increase inequalities. Considering
‘opportunity cost’ of a child’s labor to poor families, the private cost of education is higher for poor
students than for rich students. So it is reasonable to assume that poor student have less chance of
completing any given educational cycle than relatively rich students.
In short, in countries “characterized by highly unequal distributions of personal income, sizable
secondary school fees and subsidized higher education, the educational system probably operates to
increase inequality and perpetuate poverty.”(Todaro, 1977: p.256) Unfortunately, it is the case of most
Latin American countries. Their educational systems, especially of Brazil, have acted to increase rather
than to decrease these income inequalities.
The quantitative expansion has also contributed to the efficiency.
In all educational level, Korea has recorded considerably higher pupil/teacher ratio than Latin American
countries (See Table 3). Interpreting the pupil/teacher ratio as a proxy of educational quality, one may
conclude Korea obtained high enrollment ratios at the expense of quality of education. But it is not
necessarily so. Many empirical tests demonstrate that the pupil/teacher ratio does not necessarily reflect
the quality of education. One recent evidence is the Third International Maths and Science Study
(TIMSS). “TIMSS found that France, America and Britain, where children are usually taught in classes of
twenty-odd, do significantly worse than East Asian countries where almost twice as many pupils are
crammed into each class.”4  As this study suggests if there had been no trade off between education
quantity and quality, the Korean expansionary approach could be the most important source of
educational investment efficiency.
In summary, the special feature of Korean experience in education is its efficiency. With only small
public expenditure on education compared to those of Latin American countries Korean government
managed to supply the skilled labors that the development process had been requiring. The allocation of
public resources to primary and secondary education was the major determining factor in Korea’s
successful educational strategies.5  The expansionist strategy even sacrificing educational quantitative
standard such as the pupil/teacher ratio also has contributed to raise the rate of return on educational
investment. These facts raise deeper question: What has made Korea to choose this kind of policies?
When we talk about education policy strategies, our attention is usually concentrated in the supply side
of educational services. The variables such as overall budgetary commitment to education or the
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distribution of budget among different levels of education are closely watched. However, these variables
alone cannot explain how education plays such a significant role for the economic growth in Korea 6. We
need to understand the secret of maintaining the minimum quality standard of education and the
determinants of demand for educational services. More specifically,  we should explain why the demand
for education in Korea remains high in spite of the poor material condition. The writers of cultural
explanations may claim that unusually high and inelastic demand for education comes from the respect
of  learning which is a part of the Confucian value system. It may contain a grain of truth but it is a
hypothesis never tested. For economists, the investment is a function of its rate of return. In a traditional
Confucian society, high learning meant job, respect, power, and social status, in short everything. Then
the high demand for education is the natural response to this incentive system.
But rewarding high learning with high rate of return occurs in most developing countries. Then why other
countries did not take the same path choosing the kind of policies Korea had? Have not people
responded to the incentive of high reward? Or are the demands suppressed to guard the interest of the
ruling and learned class? As noted above, in most Latin American countries, the unfortunate
combination among variables -- the unequal income distribution, the higher education centered
educational system, and the incentive mechanism -- worked to form a vicious cycle between income
distribution and education. On the other hand, in Korea, the equitable initial income distribution, well
chosen educational system, and the Confucian flavored incentive mechanism have worked to ensue the
opposite result.
V. Culture and Economic Growth
For a long time critiques of the neoclassical growth theory have been arguing that major determinants of
long-run growth are the product not of rational behavior in the economists’ sense of term, but of non-
rational habit. To those academics who normally give more weight to the uniqueness of historical
experience of a society, factors such as education, economic instability or openness are more of cultural
products rather than  the product of rational choice obeying universal law.
If only geography and culture matter so that  their claims acquire credibility, its implication in practical
level is very serious because it implies one country’s success cannot be replicated by other countries.
This, inevitably, leads us to intriguing questions about the relationship between culture and economic
growth.
The classic pronouncement of the thought which links culture and economic performance was Max
Weber’s study of capitalism and the Protestant work ethic. For him the Protestantism was the reason
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why one region of Europe was more prosperous than other areas. In the 1950s, some writers of this
tradition pointed the Confucian value reflected on class stratification disdaining commerce and industry
as responsible for the Asian economic retardation.
In the recent upsurge of interest in culture, the theme has returned to explain the old and new fact.
However, it is embarrassing to see the same factors of one value system doing the opposite role  now.
To Thomas Sowell(1995), a disdain for commerce and industry was a Hispanic trait and the cause of
Latin American problems. Harrison(1992) and Lee Kuan Yew, the ex-premier of Singapore, defended
the thesis that the respect for education and work ethic of Confucian value, which once was blamed for
Asian economic under-performance, is the key to economic success of Asian countries.
The fundamental doubts that plague all these cultural explanations come from the definition of culture.
What most culture writers mean by this term is so vague and broad that, you could argue, they can
hardly be useful to explain behavior. The same culture embraces such conflicting features that it can
produce wholly different effects at different times. A culture may disdain commerce and industry but
value education at the same time as it occurred in the Confucian value system. The former attitude
certainly discourages the economic activities and the latter help the economic development. However,
the effect of education on economic growth will be much greater in information age than in agricultural
age. Therefore, it is important to understand how each component or aspect of a culture affects the
economic behavior.
The second problem with the culture argument that is also derived from the vagueness of the definition,
is a belief that the concept of culture excludes rationality. If we admit that education, fertility, institutions
be cultural variables, the critics of the growth model are right. Many determinants of long run growth are
cultural. However, what they have missed is that these variables, classified as cultural, can be changed
by policies and can be modified through economic incentives and, above all, can be explained by
rationality. Thus there is no reason why other poor countries should not aspire to the remarkable
progress witnessed in East Asia and replicate their success.
Barro(1996) shows a very meaningful result regarding the cultural factors on growth. The unusual
growth experiences of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and East Asia is mostly accounted for by
explanatory variables, already cited in Section II. The regional dummies representing three regions in
the regression were statistically insignificant. The inclusion of inflation, government consumption, and
schooling , is critical for eliminating regional dummies. If the regional dummies were essential, it might
have been claimed these were cultural.
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VI. Conclusion
The economic performance of East Asian countries during the last thirty years is so exceptional that it
has raised many questions. On the other hand, new economic theories that have provided the ground
for alternative interpretation of the fact, have encouraged debates on many fronts and have claimed
empirical researches as supporting evidence. Consequently large numbers of studies have loomed up.
We surveyed selectively a part of them.
Even though there is no consensus on which one is more important than others, these new empirical
findings point out the following factors as the crucial  determinants of long-run growth:  initial level of
income per capita, initial schooling, life expectancy, fertility, dependency ratio, population growth rate,
government consumption, openness, institutional quality, inflation, terms of trade, and physical
geography. A part of them is exogenously given by nature, by history or by international environment.
The rests are variables that can be changed by government policies as long as governments have a will
to do so. However, some of them can be changed only in the long run.
One important issue regarding Korean experience in education was how education played such a
significant role in the economic development process with only meager investment. The emphasis given
to the primary and secondary education compared to the tertiary was found to be the key both to
increase the efficiency of educational investment and to form a virtuous cycle between education and
income distribution. And the expansionist strategy even sacrificing material conditions of education was
an additional source of increasing returns to educational investment.
Another issue is whether the success of East Asian countries can be replicated by other developing
nations. If culture matters, the answer will be negative. But the concept of culture is so broad that it
cannot be a explanatory variable determining long-run economic growth of a nation. Since many
variables, classified as cultural, can be changed by policies,  there is no reason why other poor countries
should not aspire to the remarkable progress witnessed in East Asia.
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TABLES
 Table 1. School Enrollment in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Rep. of Korea
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993
School enrollment, primary (% gross)
Argentina 105 106 106 107 111 - 107
Brazil - 88 99 101 109 111 -
Chile 107 118 109 105 100 99 98
Korea, Rep. 103 107 110 97 105 103 101
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
Argentina 44 54 56 70 - - -
Brazil 26 26 34 36 39 43 -
Chile 39 48 52 67 73 69 70
Korea, Rep. 42 56 78 92 90 91 93
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
Argentina - - 21.8 35.7 - - 40.5
Brazil - - 11.1 - 11.3 11.5 11.5
Chile - - 12.3 15.5 20.5 25.8 26.7
Korea, Rep. - - 14.7 34 38.6 42.4 48.2
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators on CD-ROM, 1997.
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Table 2. Public current expenditure by level of education in four countries
(% of total)
1st level 2nd level 3rd level other Not distributed
Argentina 1980 40.1 25.6 22.7 1.9 9.7
1986 5.5 43.3 30.8 2.4 18.0
1990 3.4 44.9 46.7 2.4 2.6
1993 72.2 - 18.1 - 9.7
Brazil 1980 44.8 7.1 18.9 - 29.3
1985 45.9 7.7 19.6 - 26.8
1989 48.8 6.9 25.6 1.3 17.5
Chile 1980 42.7 18.0 33.2 2.3 3.8
1985 51.0 19.5 20.3 6.0 3.2
1991 49.2 15.3 21.6 9.3 4.6
1993 48.6 13.4 21.0 8.1 8.8
Korea 1980 49.9 33.2 8.7 0.1 8.2
1985 46.7 36.7 10.9 0.9 4.8
1990 44.3 34.1 7.4 1.3 12.8
1992 42.2 39.4 6.9 2.4 9.1
Source: UNESCO, '95 Statistical Yearbook. UNESCO Publishing & Bernan Press, 1995.
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Table 3. Pupil/Teacher Ratio in four countries
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary
1982 1987 1991 1993
Argentina 20.3 19.5 16.5 -
Brazil 24.5 23.0 22.5 22.7
Chile 33.4 29.1 24.9 26.2
Korea, Rep. 43.9 36.7 34.4 31.1
pupil-teacher ratio, secondary
1980 1985 1990 1991
Argentina - 7.8 - 8.0
Brazil 14.2 14.6 14.4 14.6
Chile - - - 14.3
Korea 39.1 35 25.2 23.2(94)
pupil-teacher ratio, tertiary
1980 1985 1990 1993
Argentina 10.6 12.0 - 12.0(91)
Brazil 12.8 12.4(86) 11.7 11.6
Chile - - - 13.8
Korea 29.2 37.6 20.0 18.3
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators on CD-ROM, 1997.
UNESCO, '95 Statistical Yearbook. UNESCO Publishing & Bernan Press, 1995.
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APPENDIX
Table A: Public Spending in Education in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Republic of Korea
1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993
Public spending on education, primary (% of GDP)
Argentina - 0.90 - - 1.55 2.33
Brazil - 1.60 - - - -
Chile 1.30 1.81 1.94 1.27 1.25 1.23
Korea, Rep. 0.99 1.49 1.60 1.36 1.40 1.43
Public spending on education, secondary (% of GDP)
Argentina - - - - 0.80 -
Brazil - 0.30 - - - -
Chile 0.50 0.76 0.74 0.42 0.38 0.34
Korea, Rep. 0.41 1.00 1.26 1.04 1.31 1.36
Public spending on education, tertiary (% of GDP)
Argentina - 0.50 - - 0.54 0.59
Brazil - 0.70 - - - -
Chile 0.94 1.41 0.77 0.49 0.52 0.53
Korea, Rep. 0.19 0.26 0.37 0.23 0.23 0.27
Total public spending on formal education(% of GDP)*
Argentina - 1.40 - - 2.89 2.92
Brazil - 2.60 - - - -
Chile 2.74 3.98 3.45 2.18 2.15 2.10
Korea, Rep. 1.59 2.75 3.23 2.63 2.94 3.06
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators on CD-ROM, 1997.
 Note: * = primary + secondary + tertiary
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Table B: Education in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Rep. of Korea: Some
comparisons
School life
expectancy
number of years
Net enrollment
ratios at the first
level
Percentage of
cohort reaching
grade5
Number of 3rd
level students
per
100,000
inhabitants
Public
expenditure on
education as %
of GNP
1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
Argentina 13.2 95 - 3323 3.3
Brazil 10.9 90 72 1079 -
Chile 11.8 87 95 2336 2.7
Korea 13.7 99 100 4253 4.2
Latin America - - - - 4.6
East Asia - - - - 3.0
Source: UNSCO, '95 Statistical Yearbook. UNESCO Publishing & Bernan Press, 1995.
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Table C: Education and Population in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Rep. of Korea
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993 1995
Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population)
Argentina 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 - - 0.6
Brazil 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 - - 0.6
Chile 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 - - 0.6
Korea, Rep. 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 - - 0.4
Age efficiency, primary (net enrollment as % of gross)
Argentina 89.89 90.79 - - - - - -
Brazil 92.44 80.40 81.76 81.50 81.34 80.70 80.23 -
Chile 86.44 83.86 - - 87.82 86.86 88.71 -
Korea, Rep. 60.61 61.08 63.58 62.01 66.07 61.48 60.04 -
Illiteracy rate, adult total (% of people 15+)
Argentina - - - - 4.7 - - 3.8
Brazil - - - - 18.9 - - 16.7
Chile - - - - 6.6 - - 4.8
Korea, Rep. - - - - 3.7 - - 2
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators on CD-ROM, 1997.
Table D: GNP per capita in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Rep. of Korea
Atlas method (US$)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993 1995
Argentina 1210 2680 2890 2660 3270 6110 7260 8030
Brazil 450 1170 2190 1580 2610 2660 2670 3640
Chile 830 920 2160 1410 2170 2860 3190 4160
Korea, Rep. 270 640 2330 2260 5770 7220 7720 9700
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators on CD-ROM, 1997.
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